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Abstract
Conference presentations differ from other voluntary disclosures in that the audience for the disclosure is
co-located with managers in a well-defined physical and social setting, or “disclosure milieu.” The milieu
affects the degree to which conference participants can update their prior beliefs about the firm with
information signals obtained through interactions with management and other informed participants.
While the average abnormal stock return and volume reactions to presentations are positive, there is a
great deal of cross-sectional variation as indicated by negative median reactions. We find that conference
characteristics that determine the nature of the audience and its interactions, such as sponsor, location,
size, and industry-focus, are significantly associated with the market reaction, consistent with the
disclosure milieu explaining the cross-sectional variation in the information content of the presentation.
We also find that conference characteristics explain changes in subsequent analyst and institutional
investor following, consistent with the disclosure milieu creating differences in access to management by
potential new investors and analysts.
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Conference Presentations and the Disclosure Milieu

Abstract
Conference presentations differ from other voluntary disclosures in that the audience for the
disclosure is co-located with managers in a well-defined physical and social setting, or
“disclosure milieu.” The milieu affects the degree to which conference participants can update
their prior beliefs about the firm with information signals obtained through interactions with
management and other informed participants. While the average abnormal stock return and
volume reactions to presentations are positive, there is a great deal of cross-sectional variation as
indicated by negative median reactions. We find that conference characteristics that determine
the nature of the audience and its interactions, such as sponsor, location, size, and industry-focus,
are significantly associated with the market reaction, consistent with the disclosure milieu
explaining the cross-sectional variation in the information content of the presentation. We also
find that conference characteristics explain changes in subsequent analyst and institutional
investor following, consistent with the disclosure milieu creating differences in access to
management by potential new investors and analysts.

1. Introduction
Conference presentations are a prevalent form of managerial communication, providing
one of the few settings that allow face-to-face interactions among managers, investors, analysts,
and other stakeholders. Conferences typically bring together a large number of companies to the
same location for a series of presentations to an audience invited by the conference sponsor. As
a result of this co-location, conference presentations differ from other types of voluntary
disclosure, such as press releases and conference calls, because they occur within a well-defined
physical and social setting, which we refer to as the “disclosure milieu.” Each conference setting
creates a disclosure milieu that determines the composition of the audience and the extent of the
interactions among managers and the audience in the same place and time as the manager makes
the disclosure. We predict that the disclosure milieu influences the ability of participants to
revise their beliefs about the firm and, hence, the market reaction to the presentation.
Prior work suggests that the audience for a disclosure could affect its information content
due to differences in investors’ private information, consensus in beliefs, and ability to interpret
disclosures (Holthausen and Verrecchia [1990], Indjejikian [1991], Kim and Verrecchia [1994]).
The disclosure milieu heightens these potential audience effects by bringing together participants
with private information to the same location and facilitating information transfers through
explicit discussions with managers and other participants, higher-order belief formation, and
assessment of nonverbal cues. Thus, the milieu affects the degree to which participants can
Bayesian update their prior beliefs about the firm with information signals obtained from
management and other participants before, during, and after the presentation. In the conference
setting, the disclosure milieu is determined by conference characteristics such as sponsor,
location, size, and industry-focus. We use a sample of 95,105 conference presentations that
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exhibit cross-sectional variation in these characteristics to test whether the disclosure milieu
predictably explains the absolute stock return and share turnover reaction to the presentations
and the subsequent changes in following by institutional investors and analysts.
Conference presentations typically last less than an hour and include a mix of prepared
remarks and question and answer periods. While Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) does not
preclude limited-access presentations, managers are still subject to selective disclosure
restrictions (Cooley Godward [2000]). Presentations are not tied to another major information
event (e.g., earnings announcements) because conference sponsors must schedule the conference
well in advance and at a time when a large number of managers can attend. As a result, the goal
of the conference presentation is often to provide a broader, more qualitative view of the firm’s
strategy and operations. Managers have incentives to present at conferences to improve the
firm’s visibility; to meet the demands of stakeholders for access to top management; to solidify
business relationships with the conference sponsor; and to avoid negative attributions that could
arise from failing to attend a conference at which most of the firm’s peers are represented.
We measure the information content of the presentation using abnormal absolute returns
and abnormal share turnover in the three days around the presentation. We find significant mean
increases in abnormal absolute returns and turnover during the presentation window that
represent 5-10% increases over the prior 90-day estimation period. However, the median values
are negative (and larger in magnitude in the case of absolute returns) because only 40-45% of the
firms experience greater absolute returns and turnover than in the estimation period. The crosssectional variation in these univariate effects is not surprising because managers generally do not
disclose new information during presentations; rather, most of the information content comes

2

from the private information of the audience. Our examination of the disclosure milieu
highlights the factors that drive these cross-sectional differences in market response.
We use the conference sponsor, location, size, and industry-focus to measure differences
in the disclosure milieu. We find that the disclosure milieu is significantly associated with the
information content of the presentation, controlling for a large number of firm characteristics and
for concurrent information releases. Presentations at conferences sponsored by product market
intermediaries and top brokerage firms exhibit greater market reactions than conferences hosted
by small brokerage firms, analyst societies, stock exchanges, and IR firms. For product market
conferences, this finding is consistent with management having incentives to disclose new
information to business partners and with the presence of an audience with product-specific
private information. For top brokerages, the result is consistent with their conferences attracting
a larger pool of sophisticated investors with greater potential private information.
We also find that presentations at conferences held in money centers and destination
resorts generate more information content than those held in other US cities or outside the US.
Information content is also positively associated with conference size. The results for money
center and large conferences reflect a larger audience of sophisticated investors with greater
private information and more higher-order belief formation. While destination conferences
typically draw smaller crowds, they allow for more interactions among the participants who
remain at the venue longer; thus, this finding reflects increased information content arising from
the intensity of interactions. Presentations at industry-focused conferences convey more
information than at broad conferences, consistent with the audience having more industryspecific private information that can facilitate information transfers across presentations.
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Combined, these results show that the disclosure milieu affects the information content of the
presentation, highlighting the role of the audience and its interactions in the disclosure process.
Next, we examine how the disclosure milieu affects changes in following by analysts and
institutional investors. We control for the information content of the presentation so that the
composition of the audience and its interactions will be the major determinants of whether a
presentation attracts new analysts and investors. We find that analysts are more likely to
increase following of firms presenting at industry-focused conferences, consistent with the
industry-based structure of analyst coverage. Analysts are less likely to increase following after
presentations at product market conferences or top brokerage conferences, consistent with
analysts not being the target audience in either of these settings. Product market conferences are
not structured to facilitate interactions between managers and analysts, and top brokerage
conferences generally exclude analysts from competing brokerage firms.
Institutional investors are more likely to increase ownership of firms presenting at
conferences hosted by top brokerage firms and at large conferences. These results suggest that
institutional investors are more likely to attend conferences that provide preferential access to a
large number of firms, thus reducing the costs of learning about these firms and their managers.1
Moreover, the finding that top brokerage conferences are associated with larger changes in
institutional ownership, but smaller changes in analyst coverage, provides strong evidence that
the disclosure milieu (e.g., access to management) drives the results, rather than an omitted
factor correlated with both conference characteristics and following by analysts and investors.
This paper contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by providing evidence that
the physical and social setting in which a disclosure takes place—the “disclosure milieu”—
1

As further evidence of the importance of access to management, Bushee, Jung, and Miller [2011] find that
investors tend to execute larger, more profitable trades during periods when they have direct, private access to
managers. They also find that this result is distinct from the milieu effects shown in this paper.
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influences the market reaction to disclosure. Unlike most verbal or written disclosures,
conference presentations occur within a disclosure milieu that determines the audience and its
degree of interactions. In doing so, the milieu affects the nature and degree of private
information that is impounded into price through mechanisms such as higher-order beliefs and
nonverbal cues that can only be obtained through co-location of managers and other informed
participants. The milieu also affects the firm’s ability to attract new analysts and institutional
investors by influencing the pool of participants and their access to management. Our findings
suggest that examining the disclosure milieu could provide new insights into the market response
to voluntary disclosure.
The next section reviews prior literature and provides some background on conferences
to motivate our predictions. Section 3 describes the sample and defines the variables used in the
analyses. We present results on the stock return and trading volume reactions to presentations in
Section 4 and on changes in institutional investor and analyst following subsequent to
presentations in Section 5. We offer conclusions in Section 6.

2. Motivation and Predictions
2.1 Prior Literature
A large literature finds significant effects of voluntary disclosure on stock returns, trading
volume, and following by analysts and institutional investors. Much of this literature focuses on
written disclosures or disclosure indices (e.g., Lev and Penman [1990], Skinner [1994], Lang and
Lundholm [1996a], Healy, Hutton, and Palepu [1999], Bushee and Noe [2000], Hutton, Miller
and Skinner [2003]). Studies of conference calls provide evidence that interactive verbal
communications are an important source of information for investors and analysts (Frankel,
Johnson and Skinner [1999], Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto [2002], Bushee, Matsumoto and
5

Miller [2003], [2004]). However, in conference calls, there is no possibility for interaction
before or after the call, and managers can control the queuing of questioners to reward or punish
analysts (Mayew [2008]).
In recent years, managers have increasingly added conferences presentations to their
disclosure activities (Jackson [2007]). Despite the growth in conferences, only one published
study examines these presentations. Francis, Hanna, and Philbrick [1997] examine a sample of
1,199 presentations to the New York Society of Security Analysts during the nascent period for
management presentations (1986-1992). They find significant positive returns on the day of the
presentation, particularly for undervalued firms, consistent with the presentation mitigating
visibility issues. They also find an increase in analyst following after the presentation, but no
relation with forecast accuracy. These findings indicate the information potential of conference
presentations. However, because the common conference format at the time was a single
sponsor and location with generally few firms presenting in each conference, there was no
opportunity to study cross-sectional variation in the audience or its degree of interactivity.
2.2 Conference Presentations
Subsequent to the Francis, et al. [1997] sample period, the number and variety of
organizations sponsoring conferences have grown substantially. Between 1999 and 2007, there
were over 95,000 presentations at more than 5,400 conferences hosted by over 800
organizations. Meanwhile, the number of analyst society conferences has declined over time
dropping from 6% of our sample in 1999 to 1% in 2007. Most conferences are now hosted by
analysts through their brokerage firms.2

2

By sponsoring their own conferences, analysts can provide access to only the brokerage firm’s best clients. A
recent survey indicated that one-third of the commission payments used to compensate brokerage firms is to reward
brokers for corporate access, including the facilitation of meetings with company management and invitations to
conferences (Greenwich Associates [2010]).
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Conferences are publicized weeks in advance and are generally by invitation only. Reg
FD does not preclude limited-access conferences; however managers are still subject to
restrictions on selective disclosure of material information.3 To comply with Reg FD, companies
often provide webcasts and/or concurrent public releases (e.g., Form 8-K filings). Presentations
typically last 30 to 45 minutes and consist of management making prepared remarks and then
taking questions. These presentations focus on a more overarching view of the company and its
strategy, without having to explain a recent information event.4 Presentations also help
managers develop a commitment to transparency through face-to-face interactions, which many
IR professionals view as the most crucial part of a firm’s communication strategy (Bushee and
Miller [Forthcoming]). Participants attending a conference potentially gain more information
than those who only listen to webcasts because their co-location with managers and other
participants allows them to assess the veracity of managers’ statements through visual and verbal
cues, to judge other participants’ reactions to the discussion, and to continue conversations with
managers and other participants outside of the presentation.5
The co-location of managers and participants creates a “disclosure milieu” in which the
audience and its interactions affect the information content of the presentation. Prior work
suggests that the audience for a disclosure could affect its information content due to differences
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The SEC does not define “material information” and firms have some latitude to discuss details of the business to
fill in the “mosaic” of information without violating Reg FD (Cooley Godward [2000]). In 2005, a district court
judge dismissed a Reg FD action against Siebel Systems, saying (in part) “Regulation FD does not require that
corporate officials only utter verbatim statements that were previously publicly made.” Further, the judge argued
that “Although stock movement is a relevant factor to be considered in making the determination as to materiality, it
is not, however, a sufficient factor alone to establish materiality” and that “the actions taken by those in attendance
at the speaking engagement, although a relevant consideration, do not change the nature or content of statements”
(SEC v. Siebel Systems, et al. [2005]). This ruling shows the difficultly in determining if Reg FD has been violated.
4
As one asset manager put it, “what we're trying to do is build a jigsaw puzzle…[we] don't go to conferences to be
told how much a company is going to earn next quarter. [We] go to uncover the fundamentals of the company…and
trends that will change dynamics in the industry five years ahead” (Dow Jones Newswires [2001]).
5
Consistent with the importance of co-location, attempts to hold “virtual” conferences have failed. In a virtual
conference, the sponsor sets a schedule of interactive webcast presentations by managers without any co-location,
saving the costs of time and travel. These presentations peaked at 63 in 2002 and have dropped to only 18 in 2007.
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in investors’ private information, consensus in beliefs, and ability to interpret disclosures
(Holthausen and Verrecchia [1990], Indjejikian [1991], Kim and Verrecchia [1994]). A large
number of participants with private information and greater ability to ask questions of managers
and other participants should increase the “informedness” of the presentation (Holthausen and
Verrecchia [1990]). Participants can supplement their explicit information gathering with
higher-order beliefs formed by observing the behavior of other participants. Morris and Shin
[2003] show a “publicity multiplier” effect in which “public briefings have a larger impact on the
market than bilateral briefings with the same information because they automatically convey to
participants not only information about market conditions, but also valuable information about
the beliefs of the other participants.” Co-location also allows participants to use nonverbal cues
to assess the credibility of any information. Research on nonverbal cues finds that a large
percentage of information is communicated through body language, facial expressions, and vocal
tone (Mehrabian [1972], Andersen [2008], Mayew and Venkatachalam [Forthcoming]).6 Thus,
the information content of a conference presentation is a not only a function of explicit
information releases, but also the degree to which the disclosure milieu facilitates information
transfers, formation of higher-order beliefs, and the assessment of nonverbal cues.
2.3 Predictions
We develop predictions for which conference characteristics create a disclosure milieu
that provides a larger potential for belief revision and, hence, greater information content to the
presentation. We also form predictions for which conference characteristics facilitate greater
increases in following by analysts and institutional investors, who use the conference interactions
to assess management’s credibility and commitment to transparency. We illustrate the

6

Some institutional investors actively evaluate nonverbal information by hiring ex-CIA or ex-FBI agents to watch
management for signals of extreme stress or dishonesty (Rodier [2010]).
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conference characteristics by referring to examples in Panel A of the Appendix, which provides a
list of conferences taking place on October 3, 2007.
2.3.1 Conference Sponsor
The conference sponsor influences the disclosure milieu by inviting the firms and
audience to the conference. We divide sponsors into three categories: product market, top
brokerage firm, and other capital market (see Panel B of the Appendix for details). “Product
market” conferences are sponsored by non-profit trade associations (e.g., Independent Petroleum
Association of America), consulting firms (e.g., Sachs Associates) and media outlets (e.g.,
CFO.com), with the goal of facilitating management interactions with business partners.
Investors and analysts can attend as well, but they do not necessarily receive direct access to
managers. Managers use these presentations to provide their view of the industry, and they often
unveil new technologies, products, or business relationships. Capital market conferences focus
on meeting investor and analyst demands for access to management. The presentations are
designed to provide an overview of the firm’s operations and strategy and allow participants to
fill-in their “mosaic” of information about the firm. Within this group, “top brokerage firm”
conferences (e.g., Bear Stearns) are organized by the analysts in the brokerage firm and attract a
wide range of institutional investors with a large amount of private information, but generally
exclude analysts from other brokerage firms. In contrast, “other capital market” conferences are
hosted by small brokerage firms (e.g., William Blair & Co.), stock exchanges (e.g., Borsa Italia),
analyst societies (e.g., Consumer Analyst Group of New York), and investor relations firms.
They tend to be smaller conferences focused on improving visibility for participating firms.
We expect that presentations at product market conferences have greater information
content than presentations at other capital market conferences due to managers’ incentives to
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disclose new product information and to the ability of investors to assess the reactions of product
market stakeholders. We also expect that presentations at top brokerage conferences have
greater information content than presentations at other capital market conferences due a greater
number of sophisticated investors with private information. Controlling for any information
content of the presentation, we expect that product market conferences lead to smaller increases
in analyst and institutional investor following because they are not designed to foster interaction
among managers, analysts, and investors. For top brokerage conferences, we predict that the
combination of more large institutional investors and general exclusion of outside analysts leads
to a greater (smaller) effect on institutional investor (analyst) following.
2.3.2 Geographic Location
The geographic location of the conference affects the disclosure milieu by influencing the
size of the audience and the degree of interactions outside of the presentation. We divide
location into four groups: money centers, destinations, other US cities, and non-US cities (see
Panel C of the Appendix). “Money center” conferences are held in New York, Boston, San
Francisco, and Chicago, where a substantial number of buy-side investors and analysts are based.
The proximity to a large pool of capital market participants draws a larger audience, increasing
both the informedness of the presentation and the number of potential new investors and
analysts. “Destination” conferences are held in locations such as Florida, Arizona, Southern
California, and Las Vegas that require both investors and managers to travel long distances. Due
to the time commitment for travel and the desired location, participants are more likely to stay at
the conference venue over a multi-day period, increasing the number of potential interactions
between managers and investors. Conferences held in “other US” cities tend to focus on either
regional firms or a certain industry (e.g., Marcus Evans Defense Conference in Arlington, VA).
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Finally, conferences held in “non-US cities” provide a venue to help firms overcome home bias
and attract foreign investment (Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller [2004]). However, such
conferences are less likely to attract US investors and analysts.
We expect that presentations at money center and destination conferences have greater
information content and subsequent increases in analyst and institutional investor following than
presentations at other US cities due to their larger audiences and greater opportunities for
interactions, respectively. We expect lower information content, and less impact on US analysts
and investors, at non-US conferences as the goal is to increase visibility among foreign investors.
2.3.3 Other Characteristics
Conferences vary in the number of firms presenting, which influences the disclosure
milieu by determining the size of the audience. Large conferences provide a low-cost way for
participants to view a large number of firms in a short time period and, thus, they attract more
market participants. Presentations at large conferences should produce larger stock market
reactions if they allow a greater number of investors to have access to management, increasing
the informedness of the presentation. Larger conferences also provide more opportunity for
information transfer across presentations due to the greater number of firms. We expect
conference size to be positively associated with both the information content of the presentation
and the subsequent change in institutional investor and analyst following.
The number of industries represented at the conference affects the disclosure milieu by
influencing the potential amount of information transfer. Some conferences are focused on one
industry (e.g., Credit Suisse Aerospace and Defence Conference), while others are focused on an
investment style (e.g., William Blair Micro-/ Small-Cap Growth Conference). Industry
conferences are more likely to attract a large number of analysts and investors with specialized
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knowledge of that industry. Thus, for any given firm, the percentage of the audience with
potential interest in the firm is greater than at a broad conference. This greater pool of interested
attendees with industry-specific knowledge should produce a larger stock market reaction to the
presentation due to the informedness effect and greater information transfers (Lang and
Lundholm [1996b]). Also, because analysts and investors specialize in sectors, presentations at
industry-focused conferences should also be more effective at increasing analyst and institutional
investor following. We expect greater information content and larger increases in investor and
analyst following for presentations at industry-focused conferences.
While the number of recent conference presentations a company has given is not a
characteristic of the disclosure milieu, we expect that more prior presentations will reduce the
potential for new insights to investors’ private information. However, multiple presentations
indicate a commitment to transparency and allow managers to interact with more potential
investors and analysts, increasing the likelihood that some decide to follow the firm. We predict
that more frequent presentations will be associated with less information content, but greater
increases in analyst and investor following.
One caveat to these predictions is that the disclosure milieu could also proxy for
managers’ incentives to selectively disclose new material information. While such actions
would violate Reg FD, we cannot dismiss this possibility. Thus, our predictions are conditional
on the assumption that any potential selective disclosure is not correlated with these conference
characteristics. However, if the results were driven solely by selective disclosure, it would still
imply that the disclosure milieu is important, but as a mechanism for eliciting private disclosure
rather than as a mechanism for the audience to affect the information content of the conference.7

7

Bushee, et al. [2011] use a sample of US capital market conferences with transcripts to identify situations in which
investors have formal off-line access to managers in a one-on-one or breakout session. They find an increase in

12

3. Sample and Variables
3.1 Sample
We obtain data on conference presentations between 1999 and 2007 from the Thomson
Reuters’ Street Events database. For each presentation, Thomson provides the firm name, ticker,
conference name, date, time, and location.8 Thomson collects this data from the conference
sponsors and presenting companies to alert its clients of upcoming conferences and to provide
webcasts. Over 57% of the conferences are one-day events, 26% are two-day events, and 15%
are three-to-five-day events. After eliminating presentations by individuals unaffiliated with
companies, panel discussions, annual meetings, analyst meetings that are misclassified as
conference presentations (all in 1999), and presentations where the conference was cancelled
(most were right after 9/11/2001), we have 120,991 conference presentations by 13,346 firms.
Next, we obtain stock return, trading volume, and industry data from the CRSP database.
The requirement of CRSP data eliminates 15,886 presentations given by 6,085 firms, which
include private firms, OTC Bulletin Board and Pink Sheets firms, and non-US firms. Finally, we
obtain institutional investor ownership data from the Thomson Reuters Form 13F database,
analyst following data from the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database, and data on firm
characteristics from the Compustat database. After requiring this data, we have a final sample of
95,105 presentations by 5,910 firms at 5,464 conferences sponsored by 849 organizations.

average trade sizes and potential trading gains during the hours when off-line access is provided. While their results
could indicate selective disclosure, it could also be consistent with investors using this access to update private
information by asking for specific qualitative information or by assessing nonverbal cues. In any case, they find that
the conference characteristics examined in this paper do not proxy for formal offline access to managers.
8
The Thomson data is indexed by the current company ticker symbol, with acquired firms listed under the
acquirer’s ticker. In 1999 and since 2002, Thomson provides the company name at the time of the presentation,
which allows us to identify the firm making the presentation. When Thomson does not list the company name, we
check Factiva for press releases to identify the firm presenting. When we were unable to classify the presentation
using Factiva, we classified it under the acquiring firm, which adds noise to some of the earlier data.
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Table 1 presents a breakdown of the sample by conference characteristics. Panel A
shows the sponsors and locations of the presentations by calendar year. The number of
conference presentations has grown over time, with a slight reversal in 2007. This general
upward trend is attributable to both an increase in the number of presentations and an increase in
Thomson’s coverage of them. The panel shows that about 11% of the presentations are at
conferences focused on product markets, whereas the remaining 89% are roughly split between
top brokerages and other capital market conferences. Money centers are the most common
location for conference presentations (65%), followed by destinations (22%), other US cities
(8%), and non-US locations (6%).
Panel B reports the number of industry-focused conferences and their distribution across
sponsors and locations. We define an industry-focused conference as having fewer than 4
industries represented.9 About 28% of the conferences are industry-focused, suggesting that
sponsors usually include a broad number of industries in conferences, likely to increase potential
attendance by investors. Almost 60% of product-market conferences are industry-focused,
which is expected based on their goal of cultivating business relationships. Industry-focused
conferences comprise an above-average percent of those held in other US cities (35%) and
outside the US (57%), and a below-average percent of destination conferences (18%). Panel C
presents a cross-tabulation of sponsors and locations. Product market conferences are more
likely to be held at destinations than capital market conferences, which tend to be held in money
centers. However, the table shows a large amount of variation across sponsors and locations.
Panel D of Table 1 shows the Fama-French industry classification for our sample firms.
Four industries account for 63% of our sample observations: Business Services, Health Care,

9

We define industry using the 30-industry classification on Ken French’s website that was used in Brennan, Wang,
and Xia [2004]. Our results are not sensitive to expanding the definition to be fewer than five or six industries.
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Business Equipment, and Financial Services. Because of this concentration on technology and
financial services firms, all of our tests include industry fixed effects.
3.2 Variable definitions
We measure the effect of the disclosure milieu with indicator variables for product
market conferences (DPRODMKT), top brokerage firm conferences (DCAPMKT_TOP), money
center conferences (DMONCEN), destination conferences (DDEST), conferences held outside of
the US (DNONUS), and industry-focused conferences (DINDUS_CONF). Thus, the omitted
group in the analyses is broad conferences hosted by other capital market sponsors in other US
cities. The size of the conference (LCONFSIZE) is the log of one plus the number of
presentations. We measure the frequency of prior conference presentations using the log of one
plus the number of presentations given by the firm in the past 90 days (LPRIORPRES).
To control for the possibility that the market reaction surrounding a conference
presentation is driven by a concurrent material information disclosure, whether provided at the
conference or not, we collect earnings announcement dates, management forecasts, and Form 8K filings (including Form 6-K filings for foreign registrants) for our sample firms. We create an
indicator variable (DINFO_EVENT) that equals one if any of these three events occur during the
three-day conference presentation window and zero otherwise.10
We also control for a large number of firm characteristics that prior literature finds are
associated with voluntary disclosure activity. For firm size, we include the log of market value
of equity (LMV) 30 days before the presentation. We measure institutional investor following as
the percent holdings by institutions (PIH), defined as total shares owned by institutions divided

10

This variable is not a perfect control for information released at a conference because a webcast of the
presentation or open access with media coverage could satisfy the selective disclosure restrictions of Reg FD
without a Form 8-K filing. For example, even though product market conferences are often used to disclose new
product information, only 17% have an associated Form 8-K filing.
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by the total shares outstanding at the most recent calendar quarter end prior to the presentation.
We measure analyst following as the log of one plus the number of analysts issuing earnings
forecasts (LNANL) for any horizon during the calendar quarter prior to the presentation. For both
PIH and LNANL, we set the variable equal to zero for any period when the company is listed on
an exchange but there is no data available. We measure recent stock market activity with the
buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock return (ANNMAR) and the average monthly share turnover
(ANNTURN) for the year prior to 30 days before the presentation. We also include an indicator
variable for whether the company is headquartered outside the US (DFORFIRM).
We include a number of proxies for profitability, growth, and potential undervaluation,
including the earnings-price ratio (EP), dividend yield (DP), the book-to-price ratio (BP), the
most recent change in net income (CNI), and the most recent annual sales growth (SGR). As a
visibility proxy, we add an indicator variable for whether the firm is listed on a Standard &
Poor’s index (SPINDX). We include the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INTAN) to
proxy for the complexity of a firm’s business. We add a debt-to-assets leverage ratio (LEV), the
standard deviation of stock returns (STD), and beta (BETA) to control for firm risk. We proxy
for firm age with the log of the number of years the firm has been listed (LTIME).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the conference characteristics and control
variables. The mean (median) conference size is 82 (61) presentations, indicating that
conferences generally involve a large number of presentations.11 Conferences also tend to be
somewhat diverse in terms of industry membership, with a mean (median) industry size of 9 (8)
industries represented. The median firm has presented at one other conference in the prior 90
days. The mean DINFO_EVENT is 0.174, indicating that only 17% of conference presentations
11

There are 1,152 observations (1.2% of the sample) for which the conference size is only one presentation. While
many of these are company-sponsored conferences, some may be conferences for which Thomson has not collected
all of the participating firms. If we exclude these observations from the sample, the results are unchanged.
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are accompanied by material information disclosures in the form of earnings announcements
(1.0%), management forecasts (2.9%), and/or Form 8-K filings (15.0%) in the three-day window
around the presentation.12 The sample firms tend to be large US firms with high institutional
ownership (median = 67%), high analyst following (median = 9 analysts), and positive marketadjusted returns in the prior year (median = 1.5%). Conference presenters also tend to be growth
firms with higher intangibles, lower leverage, lower return volatility, and higher beta.13

4. Market Reactions to Conference Presentations
We examine the market reaction to conference presentations using the three-day trading
window (-1, +1) around the date of the presentation. We use a three-day window because 43%
of conferences are multiple-day events and one-third of the presentations occur outside of the
Eastern US time zone. Thus, information relevant to the firm could be priced on the day before
or after the actual presentation.
We measure the information content of the presentation with abnormal price variability
and share turnover because we cannot measure the market’s expectations before the presentation
or whether the presentation is good or bad news (Beaver [1968], Frankel, et al. [1999],
Landsman and Maydew [2002], Cready and Hurtt [2002]). We compute the abnormal absolute
value of size-adjusted returns (ABS_SAR) as the difference between three-day absolute sizeadjusted returns and the mean three-day absolute size-adjusted returns in an estimation period,
divided by the standard deviation of the mean absolute size-adjusted returns in the estimation
period (Cready and Hurtt [2002]). We measure abnormal share turnover (ABN_TURN) as three12

We also measured DINFO_EVENT using a five-day window; about 25% of presentations had an earnings
announcement, forecast, or 8-K filing within this window. All of our results were identical with this longer window.
13
We compared our sample to a sample of firms that did not present at conferences. In both univariate comparisons
and a logistic regression, all of the firm characteristics in Table 2 except EP and CNI were significantly different
between the two samples.
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day volume divided by shares outstanding, less the average three-day turnover in the estimation
period.14 While correlated, the two measures differ based on the ex ante consensus among
investors and ex post differences in interpretations (Kandel and Pearson [1995], Verrecchia
[2001]). Because we cannot measure ex ante or ex post beliefs in this setting, we use both
measures to assess information content (Cready and Hurtt [2002]).
Table 3 reports mean and median market reactions around the presentation. There is a
significant spike in ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN during the presentation window, as well as
significantly positive levels in the three days prior to the presentation. The mean ABS_SAR
(ABN_TURN) of 0.076 (0.148) during the conference window represents a 9% (5%) increase
over the estimation period absolute returns (turnover).15 The small magnitude of these mean
effects is not surprising given that managers generally do not disclose new information; rather,
the information content stems from the private information of the audience. The median
ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN are negative because only 40-45% of the firms experience positive
abnormal returns and turnover, suggesting that there is significant cross-sectional variation in the
information content. Moreover, the correlation between ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN in the threeday window is 0.36, suggesting that some presentations produce price movements without high
volume and vice versa. These univariate results motivate our examination of the disclosure
milieu to understand the cross-sectional differences in information content.16

14

Prior work finds that ABS_SAR is more powerful than the Beaver [1968] U-statistic (which is based on squared
returns) in detecting unsigned price responses (Cready and Mynatt [1991], Subramaniam [1997]). Nevertheless, we
find similar results using the Patell [1976] U-statistic and a standardized abnormal turnover measure.
15
While the standardized ABS_SAR measure has better econometric properties than unadjusted absolute sizeadjusted returns (ASAR) (e.g., it adjusts for the normal level of ASAR and exhibits less skewness), it is harder to
interpret. The mean ASAR during the conference window is 3.5%, compared to 3.2% during the estimation period
with a standard deviation of 4.1%. Multiplying ABS_SAR by 4.1% gives an approximation of the incremental ASAR.
16
We also looked at the signed size-adjusted returns (SAR) during the three-day window. The mean (median) SAR
is 0.50% (0.15%); both are significantly greater than zero. Francis, et al. [1997] finds a similar magnitude of mean
market-model abnormal returns in the three-days around analyst presentations (0.48%). The small positive SAR
suggests that managers are on average disclosing good news, the market is correcting an undervaluation, and/or

18

Table 4 presents regressions of ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN during the presentation
window on the set of conference characteristics and the control variables. We include year and
industry fixed effects; thus, the coefficients on the conference characteristics reflect incremental
effects beyond the positive industry-year effects of the omitted group (other capital market
conferences in other US cities). Significance tests are two-tailed and based on two-way clustered
standard errors, with clustering at the firm and conference level and bootstrapping using the
jackknife method (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller [2006], Petersen [2009]).
Table 4 shows that the disclosure milieu significantly explains cross-sectional differences
in abnormal absolute returns and share turnover, even after controlling for the significant effects
of new information releases (DINFO_EVENT) and firm characteristics such as size, visibility,
recent performance, and risk. Product market (DPRODMKT) and top brokerage firm
conferences (DCAPMKT_TOP) have significantly greater absolute returns and share turnover
than other capital market conferences, suggesting that the size and nature of the audience affect
the information content either through the pool of potential private information or, in the case of
product conferences, incentives to release new information. Conference location also
significantly affects the market reaction, as presentations at money centers (DMONCEN) and
destinations (DDEST) exhibit significantly larger information content than conferences in other
US cities and outside the US (DNONUS). This finding is consistent with the market response
being impacted by both the composition of the audience and degree of interactions among
audience and presenters. There are also significantly greater market responses to presentations at
larger conferences (LCONFSIZE), consistent with these conferences attracting a larger set of
investors and increasing the informedness of the presentation. Each significant coefficient
there is upward price pressure due to attracting more investors. The only conference characteristics that
significantly increase SAR are product market conferences and conference size. The product market result is
consistent with managers using this venue to provide new product announcements.
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represents 5-10% greater abnormal absolute size-adjusted returns and share turnover than in the
omitted group. For example, a presentation at a product market conference in a money center
would produce, on average, a 3.8% absolute SAR, compared to 3.2% for a presentation at a small
brokerage firm conference in a regional US city (an increase of 19%).17
Table 4 also shows a larger absolute return response to presentations at industry-focused
conferences (DINDUS_CONF), consistent with greater information transfers among presenting
firms. There is a significantly lower absolute return response to presentations by firms that have
recently presented in other conferences (LPRIORPRES), consistent with a reduction in the
potential private information of investors due to the prior presentations. In both cases, there is no
significant effect on abnormal turnover. This finding suggests that industry expertise and prior
presentations create greater ex ante consensus among investors about the firm and a lesser degree
of ex post differences in interpretations, resulting in any new information affecting price without
a significantly higher amount of individual trades. Overall, we find that conference sponsor,
location, size, and industry-focus are significantly associated with the market reaction to
conference presentations. This evidence indicates that the disclosure milieu influences the
degree to which participants are able to revise their beliefs about the firm.18

5. Changes in Investor and Analyst Following after Presentations
We examine changes in institutional investor and analyst following after conference
presentations over two horizons. First, we report two-quarter changes in analyst following
17

To put this magnitude in perspective, we computed absolute SAR for earnings announcements, forecasts, and
Form 8-K filings during the same quarter as a presentation for our sample firms. The average three-day absolute
SAR is 6.4% for forecasts, 5.9% for earnings announcements, and 4.2% for Form 8-K filings.
18
The identity of the presenter (e.g., CEO, CFO) is a possible correlated omitted variable in this setting, but is only
available for about 10% of the presentations that have archived transcripts. We examined the transcript subsample
to test whether CEO attendance affected the market reaction. Before including a CEO indicator, we found that some
conference characteristics were no longer significant at conventional levels due to the small sample size. However,
adding a CEO indicator variable did not affect the signs or significance of any of the conference characteristics.

20

(CNANL2) and institutional investor ownership (CPIH2). CNANL2 is the difference between the
number of unique analysts issuing forecasts in the first full calendar quarter after the presentation
and the number in the calendar quarter prior to the presentation.19 CPIH2 is the difference
between institutional ownership at the end of the calendar quarter subsequent to the presentation
and the end of the quarter prior to the presentation. We do not examine the calendar quarter of
the presentation because the presentation could have taken place too late in the quarter for
investors and analysts to react. Second, we report four-quarter changes in analyst following
(CNANL4) and institutional investor ownership (CPIH4) as the difference between analyst
following and institutional ownership three full quarters after the presentation and the quarter
prior to the presentation (i.e., the same calendar quarters one year apart). The advantage of the
two-quarter change is that it more closely ties the change in analyst and investor following to the
presentation. The disadvantage of the two-quarter change is that there is seasonality in analyst
forecasting behavior (e.g., more forecasts are generally issued prior to the annual earnings) and
an increase in following may not be detected in a short window.
Table 5 provides univariate evidence showing that firms presenting at conferences
experience significant increases in both analyst following and institutional ownership, on
average, subsequent to the presentations. The mean CNANL2 (CNANL4) is 0.201 (0.326) and
the median changes are zero. These changes reflect that fact that only 40-45% of firms
experience increases in analyst coverage after a presentation, and those that do tend to have an
increase of one analyst. The magnitude of the mean increase in CNANL4 is comparable to prior
work, which typically finds a mean change in analyst following of less than one analyst after an
19

We estimated all of our results using both logged and unlogged changes in analyst following. There is some
skewness in the level of analyst following, so we use the log of analyst following as a control variable in the tables.
However, because the skewness is less pronounced in unlogged changes in analyst following and the logged changes
are more difficult to interpret, we report the unlogged changes in the tables. The signs and significance of all of the
main results are the same for logged and unlogged changes in analyst following.
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event (e.g., Healy, et al. [1999], Irani and Karamanou [2003]). Francis, et al. [1997] reports a
mean annual increase of 0.77 in analyst coverage after presentations at conferences solely
focused on analysts. Given that many conferences are not geared toward attracting analysts (e.g.,
product market), and many exclude outside analysts (e.g., top brokerage), increases in analyst
coverage should not be broadly realized in our sample.
Table 5 shows a mean (median) CPIH2 of 0.017 (0.01) and a mean (median) CPIH4 of
0.028 (0.02), with around 60% of firms experiencing increases in institutional investor
ownership. These changes are also comparable to prior work, e.g., Bushee and Noe [2000] find
an increase of 0.011 in percent transient institutional ownership for firms increasing disclosure
quality and Covrig, DeFond and Hung [2007] find firms that adopt International Accounting
Standards have 0.009 higher percentage of foreign institutional ownership.
Table 6 presents results of regressions of two- and four-quarter changes in institutional
ownership and analyst following on the set of conference characteristics and control variables.
In addition, we control for the information content of the presentation using the variables in
Table 3 (ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN), as well as signed size-adjusted returns (SAR) to capture
any potential effects due to the direction of the return reaction to the presentation. We include
year and industry fixed effects; thus, the coefficients on the conference characteristics reflect
incremental effects beyond the positive industry-year effects of the omitted group (other capital
market conferences in other US cities). Significance tests are two-tailed and based on two-way
clustered standard errors, with clustering at the firm and conference level and bootstrapping
using the jackknife method (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller [2006], Petersen [2009]).
Table 6 shows that most of the control variables significantly explain changes in analyst
and institutional investor following. Notably, the measures of the three-day market reaction to
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the presentation—ABS_SAR, ABN_TURN, and SAR—all significantly explain future changes in
analyst and investor following. Thus, the results for the conference characteristics can be
interpreted as measuring the effect of the audience and its interactions incremental to the
information content of the presentation, i.e. the effect of the milieu on participants’ ability to
assess the competence and credibility of managers, as well as their commitment to transparency.
The first two columns of Table 6 show that changes in analyst following are negatively
associated with presentations at product market conferences and top brokerage conferences,
consistent with analysts not being the target audience in either of these settings. These negative
relations still reflect increases in analyst following, but they are 7-12% smaller increases than
mean CNANL4 of 0.983 for the omitted group of other capital market conferences (which include
analyst societies). Analysts are also significantly less likely to increase coverage of firms
presenting at non-US conferences, consistent with US analysts not being the target of those
presentations. There is no significant relation between conference size and analyst following,
suggesting either that the pool of potential new analysts does not increase with the number of
firms presenting or that larger conferences are larger due to more small firms, for which analysts
are less likely to initiate coverage. Changes in analyst following are significantly positively
related to presentations at industry-focused conferences, but only using the seasonally-adjusted
CNANL4, consistent with the industry-based structure of analyst coverage. Finally, increases in
analyst following are significantly larger for firms that have presented at multiple recent
conferences, consistent with analysts initiating coverage of firms that have become more visible
and, hence, provide a bigger potential demand for analyst research and brokerage services.
Similar to analysts, the change in institutional ownership is positively associated with the
number of recent conference presentations, suggesting that frequent presentations reach a greater
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potential audience of new investors, and negatively associated with non-US conferences. Also
similar to analysts, and contrary to our predictions, there is no relation between destination or
money center conferences and institutional ownership, indicating that the increases in following
for these conferences are similar to the omitted group (other capital market conferences in other
US cities). In contrast, changes in institutional ownership are positively related to presentations
at large conferences and top brokerage firm conferences, with the latter resulting in 0.5% higher
CPIH4 than other capital market conferences. These results suggest that institutional investors
are more likely to attend conferences that provide them with preferential access to a large
number of firms, thus reducing the costs of learning about these firms.
Overall, the disclosure milieu has a significant effect on changes in analyst and investor
following incremental to the information content of the presentations. Notably, top brokerage
and larger conferences attract greater institutional ownership, but not greater analyst following,
consistent with these conferences providing a larger pool of potential investors, but not
necessarily a larger pool of potential new analysts. These findings indicate that the milieu
captures audience effects per se, rather than a general relation between conferences and visibility
that affect all market participants in the same manner.20

6. Conclusion
We examine a large sample of conference presentations to investigate how the setting in
which a disclosure takes place—the “disclosure milieu”—affects the market reaction to
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Our results could be subject to an endogeneity bias due to managers choosing to present at certain conferences;
however, we believe selection issues are likely to be limited in our sample. First, firms tend not to always select the
same bundle of conference characteristics (e.g., the average firm presenting at four conferences in a year experiences
two different types of sponsors and locations). Second, we estimated a Heckman two-stage model based on the
decision to present at any conference in a given year (using the variables in Table 2) and found that none of our
main results in Table 4 and 6 lose statistical significance when we include the inverse Mills ratio.
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disclosure. There are significant mean abnormal stock return and volume reactions to
presentations, driven by the 40-45% of the firms experiencing a positive abnormal market
response. However, there is a great deal of cross-sectional variation as indicated by the negative
median reactions. We find that conference characteristics such as sponsor, location, size, and
industry-focus are significantly associated with the market response, consistent with the
disclosure milieu explaining the cross-sectional variation in the information content of the
presentation. We also find that conference characteristics are associated with changes in analyst
following and institutional investor ownership. Analysts increase their following in firms with
frequent recent presentations at industry-focused and capital market conferences, consistent with
analysts seeking firms that are building visibility through conference activity. In contrast, large
conferences hosted by the top brokerage firms are associated with increases in institutional
ownership, consistent with these conferences attracting a larger pool of prospective investors for
the firm.
These findings contribute to the voluntary disclosure literature by documenting how the
“disclosure milieu,” or physical and social space in which a disclosure occurs, influences the
market response to disclosure by affecting the nature of the audience and its interactions. While
the conference setting allows researchers to empirically measure the characteristics of the milieu,
the disclosure milieu likely affects managers and investors in other disclosure settings that
involve a defined physical place, a specific time, and/or a limited audience (e.g., road shows or
annual shareholder meetings). For example, critics have objected to proposals for “virtual”
annual meetings based on concerns about not being able to observe other audience members and
losing the interaction with managers. Our findings suggest that, despite advances in technology,
virtual meetings are unlikely to serve as a sufficient substitute for face-to-face meetings due to
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the economically significant effect of the disclosure milieu on investors’ information gathering
and belief revision. Thus, future research examining the disclosure milieu could provide new
insights into not only the market response to voluntary disclosure, but also the choice of
voluntary disclosure venues.
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APPENDIX
Conference Examples and Classifications by Sponsor and by Location
Panel A: Conferences taking place on October 3, 2007
Conference Name
Banc of America Securities Debt Capital Markets Seminar
Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. Lisbon CDO Conference
BioContact Biopharmaceutical Partnership Symposium
BioProcess International™ Conference & Exhibition
Borsa Italia Star Conference
Consumer Analyst Group of New York Monthly Meeting
CEATEC JAPAN 2007
CFO.com Rising West Conference
CIBC World Markets 2nd Annual Industrials Conference
Credit Suisse Aerospace and Defence Conference
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. Leveraged Finance Conference
Deutsche Bank Strategy & Solutions Derivatives Conference
EEI Occupational Safety and Health Committee Conference
EEI Fall National Accounts Workshop
Gabelli & Company, Inc. 3rd Annual RFID Conference
Global CDO and Credit Opportunity Fund Conference
IBC BioProcess Conference
IEEE 2007 International Telecommunications Energy Conference
Independent Petroleum Assoc. of America’s 2007 OGIS West
IQPC Hedge Fund Operations and Compliance Conference
Leerink Swann & Company: Aesthetics Roundtable Conference
Marcus Evans Lean and Six Sigma for Defense Conference
Opal Financial Group Private Equity Summit
RailTrends 2007 Conference
Reed Exhibitions' 10th Design Engineering & Mfg Solutions Expo
Sachs Associates Biotech in Europe Investor Forum
Sibos 2007 Boston
Society for Information Display Mobile Displays 2007
Strategic Research Inst. 4th Annual Energy Tech Conference
The 2007 Private Equity Energy Forum
UBS Climate Change - Impact and Opportunities Conference
Webcom Software Business 2007 Conference
William Blair & Company Micro-/ Small-Cap Growth Conference
Windhover Information In3 East Conference

Dates
Oct 3-4
Oct 3
Oct 3-5
Oct 1-4
Oct 3-4
Oct 3
Oct 1-5
Sep 30-Oct 3
Oct 2-3
Oct 3
Oct 2-4
Oct 3-5
Sep 30-Oct 3
Sep 30-Oct 3
Oct 3
Oct 2-5
Oct 1-4
Sep 30-Oct 4
Oct 1-3
Oct 1-3
Oct 3
Oct 3-5
Oct 1-3
Oct 3-4
Oct 2-4
Oct 2-3
Oct 1-5
Oct 2-3
Oct 3-4
Oct 2-3
Oct 3
Oct 2-3
Oct 3
Oct 3-5

Location
New York, NY
Lisbon, PRT
Quebec, CAN
Boston, MA
London, GB
New York, NY
Chiba, JAP
Las Vegas, NV
New York, NY
London, GB
Scottsdale, AZ
Hong Kong, CHN
Tucson, AZ
Indianapolis, IN
Chicago, IL
Phoenix, AZ
Boston, MA
Rome, ITA
San Francisco, CA
Stamford, CT
New York, NY
Arlington, VA
Las Vegas, NV
New York, NY
Osaka, JAP
Zurich, CH
Boston, MA
San Diego, CA
San Jose, CA
New York, NY
London, GB
Santa Clara, CA
New York, NY
Boston, MA

Panel A presents the list of conferences taking place on October 3, 2007 according to Thomson Financial Street
Events.
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APPENDIX (Continued)
Conference Examples and Classifications by Sponsor and by Location
Panel B: Classification of Conference Sponsors
Number of
Organizations
Product Market Sponsors
Trade Association
Consulting Firm
Media Organization
Individual Company
University
Capital Market Sponsors
Top Brokerage Firm
Other Brokerage Firm
Analyst Society
Investor Relations Firm
Stock Exchange
Total

Number of
Conferences

Number of
Presentations

269
198
68
57
6

(31.7%)
(23.3%)
(8.0%)
(6.7%)
(0.7%)

662
514
243
71
9

(12.1%)
(9.4%)
(4.4%)
(1.3%)
(0.2%)

7,056
2,029
1,044
166
61

(7.4%)
(2.1%)
(1.1%)
(0.2%)
(0.1%)

14
191
13
25
8
849

(1.6%)
(22.5%)
(1.5%)
(2.9%)
(0.9%)

1,943
1,614
159
183
66
5,464

(35.6%)
(29.5%)
(2.9%)
(3.3%)
(1.2%)

43,867
37,091
1,777
1,435
579
95,105

(46.1%)
(39.0%)
(1.9%)
(1.5%)
(0.6%)

Panel B shows the breakdown of conference sponsors by the number of unique organizations in the category, the
number of conferences hosted by the category, and the numbers of presentations at such conferences, which is the
sample used in the empirical tests. For each conference, we first identify the sponsoring organization from the title
of the conference or from Internet searches. Next, we classify the sponsor into one of ten categories based on our
prior knowledge of the sponsor and on Internet searches for information about the sponsors. Trade associations
include research associations (e.g., American Academy of Allergy, Asthma and Immunology) and industry
associations (e.g., American Bankers Association). Consulting firms include general management consulting firms
(e.g., Accenture), industry-specific consulting firms (e.g., Cambridge Energy Research Associates), and
organizations that specialize in trade fairs (e.g., Reed Exhibitions). Media organizations include general media
outlets (e.g. Economist) and industry-focused publications (e.g., Chemical Week). Individual companies include
any company whose business is not consulting or media that hosts a conference (e.g., Ford Motor Company
Convergence Conference). Finally, a small number of universities host conferences. Brokerage firms include firms
that provide brokerage and/or investment research services. Due to the wide range of size and prestige within this
group, we subdivided it into “top” brokerage firms and other brokerage firms based on the number of conferences
hosted per year in our sample. There are 14 “top” brokerage firms that have hosted more than 12 conferences per
year (or one per month), on average, while all other brokerages have hosted fewer than nine per year. Analyst
societies include the New York Society of Security Analysts and other regional analyst groups. Investor Relations
firms are firms whose main business is to target investors for their clients’ stock, and stock exchanges include the
NYSE, Borsa Italia, and other exchanges.
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APPENDIX (Continued)
Conference Examples and Classifications by Sponsor and by Location
Panel C: Classification of Conference Locations
Number of
Conferences
Money Centers
New York City
San Francisco
Boston
Chicago
Destinations
Florida
California
Arizona
Nevada
Other
Other US
Maryland & DC
Georgia
Texas
Other
Non-US
United Kingdom
Other Europe
Canada
Asia
Other
Total

Number of
Presentations

2,012
385
337
132

(36.8%)
(7.0%)
(6.2%)
(2.4%)

42,436
9,786
6,229
2,936

(44.6%)
(10.3%)
(6.5%)
(3.1%)

255
266
101
167
79

(4.7%)
(4.9%)
(1.8%)
(3.1%)
(1.4%)

6,397
6,047
3,000
2,960
2,004

(6.7%)
(6.4%)
(3.2%)
(3.1%)
(2.1%)

97
52
108
488

(1.8%)
(1.0%)
(2.0%)
(8.9%)

1,504
1,160
900
4,217

(1.6%)
(1.2%)
(0.9%)
(4.4%)

336
234
236
157
22
5,464

(6.1%)
(4.3%)
(4.3%)
(2.9%)
(0.4%)

2,133
1,671
1,178
505
42
95,105

(2.2%)
(1.8%)
(1.2%)
(0.5%)
(0.0%)

Panel C shows the breakdown of the conference location by the number of conferences hosted and by the numbers
of presentations at such conferences in our sample. We collected the location of the conference from the Thomson
Street Events database. Money Center conferences are those held in the New York City, San Francisco, Boston, and
Chicago metro areas. We classify Destination conferences as those held in locations that would generally be
considered vacation destinations, including Florida, Southern California, Arizona, Nevada, any other obvious resort
destinations (e.g., Jackson Hole, Myrtle Beach, Caribbean islands). The authors independently attempted to classify
locations as destinations, and the overlap among our ratings was over 90%. All other conferences held in the US are
classified as “Other US.” Finally, all conferences held outside of the US, other than those in Caribbean islands,
were classified as “non-US”. We note that two difficult cities to classify were Los Angeles and New Orleans. As
the second-largest city, Los Angeles could be considered a money center. However, very few conferences in the
Los Angeles metro area are held in Los Angeles itself. Almost all are held in Orange County ocean-side
communities or in Anaheim. We classified New Orleans in the “other US” city category, rather than a destination
location, because the majority of the New Orleans conferences were hosted by local brokerages or focused on local
industries (e.g., Oil and Gas). We estimated our results with Los Angeles classified as a money center and New
Orleans classified as a destination, and the results were similar.
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TABLE 1
Sample Composition
Panel A: Conference Sponsor and Location by Year

Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total

Product
Market
33
307
429
681
1,137
1,551
2,034
2,015
2,169
10,356
10.9%

Sponsor
Capital Market
Top
Brokerages
Other
798
1,219
689
2,447
2,645
3,111
5,393
3,433
5,221
4,128
6,268
4,980
7,517
6,838
8,408
7,800
6,928
6,926
43,867
40,882
46.1%
43.0%

Location
US
Money
Centers
1,147
2,172
4,270
6,145
7,021
8,016
10,379
11,305
10,932
61,387
64.5%

Destinations
448
732
908
2,083
2,181
3,211
3,681
4,235
2,929
20,408
21.5%

Other US
434
466
698
737
858
905
1,308
1,295
1,080
7,781
8.2%

Non-US
21
73
309
542
426
667
1,021
1,388
1,082
5,529
5.8%

Other US
2,722
5,059
7,781

Non-US
3,130
2,399
5,529

Total
2,050
3,443
6,185
9,507
10,486
12,799
16,389
18,223
16,023
95,105

Panel B: Conference Sponsor and Location by Industry Focus

Conference Focus
Industry-focused
Broad
Total

Product
Market
6,049
4,307
10,356

Capital Market
Top
Brokerages
Other
11,037
9,478
32,830
31,404
43,867
40,882

US
Money
Centers
17,010
44,377
61,387
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Destinations
3,702
16,706
20,408

Total
26,564
68,541
95,105

TABLE 1 (Continued)
Sample Composition
Panel C: Cross-Tabulation of Location and Sponsor

Location
Destinations
Money Centers
Other US
Non-US
Total

Product
Market
3,442
4,366
1,471
1,077
10,356

Sponsor
Capital Market
Top
Brokerages
Other
10,696
6,270
28,737
28,284
1,894
4,416
2,540
1,912
43,867
40,882

Panel D: Fama-French Industries of Conference Presenters
Industry
Personal and Business Services
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, Pharmaceutical Products
Business Equipment
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, Trading
Petroleum and Natural Gas
Communication
Retail
Fabricated Products and Machinery
Wholesale
Utilities
Transportation
Construction and Construction Materials
Electrical Equipment
Recreation
Chemicals
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels
All Other Industries Less than 1% of the sample
Total

Frequency
16,110
16,062
15,302
12,077
4,152
3,753
3,168
2,639
2,567
2,144
1,800
1,666
1,590
1,456
1,447
1,343
7,829
95,105

Percent
16.9
16.9
16.1
12.7
4.4
4.0
3.3
2.8
2.7
2.3
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.5
1.5
1.4
8.3
100

Table 1 provides a breakdown of conference presentations by sponsor, location, year, type, and Fama-French
industries. “Product Market” conferences focus on communications with business partners and “Capital Market”
conferences involve interactions with investors and analysts. Within Capital Market conferences, those sponsored
by brokerage firms hosting more than 12 conferences per year are categorized as “Top Brokerages” and the others
are under “Other”, which includes all other brokerage firms, analyst societies, investor relations firms, and stock
exchanges. Conferences located in “Money Centers” are those held in New York City, San Francisco, Boston, and
Chicago metro areas. “Destination” conferences are held in Florida, Southern California, Arizona, Nevada and other
resort destinations. Conferences held in other U.S. locations are categorized as “Other US” and those held outside
of the U.S. are categorized as “Non-US” (see Appendix for more details). Panel A shows the sponsors and locations
of the presentations by calendar year. Panel B presents the number of industry-focused conferences and their
distribution across sponsors and locations. We define an industry-focused conference as having fewer than four
Fama-French 30 industries (from Kenneth French’s website) represented at the conference. Panel C presents a crosstabulation of conferences by location and sponsor. Panel D presents a breakdown by Fama-French industries.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics of Conference and Firm Characteristics
Variable
DPRODMKT
DCAPMKT_TOP
DMONCEN
DDEST
DNONUS
NINDUS
DINDUS_CONF
CONFSIZE
LCONFSIZE
PRIORPRES
LPRIORPRES
DINFO_EVENT
MV
LMV
PIH
NANL
LNANL
ANNMAR
ANNTURN
DFORFIRM
EP
DP
BP
CNI
SGR
SPINDX
INTAN
LEV
STD
BETA
TIME
LTIME

Mean
0.109
0.461
0.645
0.215
0.058
8.662
0.279
82.118
3.934
1.466
0.713

Std. Dev
0.312
0.498
0.478
0.411
0.234
5.872
0.449
71.735
1.131
1.618
0.610

Min
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

P25
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
4.000
0.000
27.000
3.296
0.000
0.000

Median
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
8.000
0.000
61.000
4.111
1.000
0.693

P75
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
12.000
1.000
119.000
4.779
2.000
1.099

Max
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
26.000
1.000
377.000
5.932
16.000
2.833

0.174
7,942.889
7.330
0.619
10.831
2.204
0.111
0.212
0.089
0.006
0.007
0.415
0.020
0.284
0.486
0.150
0.209
0.031
1.114
15.088
2.406

0.379
24,465.530
1.769
0.272
8.073
0.797
0.545
0.175
0.285
0.086
0.015
0.292
0.133
0.676
0.500
0.186
0.213
0.017
0.600
15.543
0.862

0.000
2.456
0.898
0.000
0.000
0.000
-1.000
0.000
0.000
-0.217
0.000
-0.210
-0.400
-0.600
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.626
0.167
0.154

0.000
431.550
6.067
0.436
5.000
1.792
-0.226
0.092
0.000
-0.015
0.000
0.215
-0.012
0.025
0.000
0.003
0.012
0.019
0.682
5.175
1.820

0.000
1,336.940
7.198
0.670
9.000
2.303
0.015
0.159
0.000
0.031
0.000
0.362
0.008
0.138
0.000
0.065
0.161
0.027
1.060
9.758
2.376

0.000
4,782.233
8.473
0.836
15.000
2.773
0.306
0.274
0.000
0.056
0.007
0.559
0.031
0.325
1.000
0.239
0.329
0.039
1.503
18.754
2.983

1.000
498,203.100
13.119
1.000
51.000
3.951
2.000
0.860
1.000
0.166
0.090
1.500
0.820
4.800
1.000
0.777
0.950
0.080
2.874
81.999
4.419
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Descriptive Statistics of Conference and Firm Characteristics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the conference and firm characteristics. The number of observations for
each of the variables is 95,105. DPRODMKT equals 1 if the presentation was at a product market-focused
conference, 0 otherwise. DCAPMKT_TOP equals 1 if the presentation was at a top brokerage firm, 0 otherwise.
DMONCEN equals 1 if the presentation was at a money center location, 0 otherwise. DDEST equals 1 if the
presentation was at a destination location, 0 otherwise. DNONUS equals 1 if the presentation was held outside of
the U.S., 0 otherwise. NINDUS is measured as the number of Fama-French industries (30 categories) represented at
the conference. DINDUS_CONF equals 1 if the presentation was at an industry-focused conference, 0 otherwise.
We define an industry-focused conference as having fewer than four industries represented at the conference.
CONFSIZE is measured as the number of presentations that occur at the conference. LCONFSIZE is the log of one
plus CONFSIZE. PRIORPRES is the number of conference presentations given by the firm in the past ninety days.
LPRIORPRES is the log of one plus PRIORPRES. DINFO_EVENT equals 1 if an earnings announcement,
management forecast, and/or Form 8-K filing (including Form 6-K filings for foreign registrants) occurred within
the three-day window surrounding the presentation, 0 otherwise. MV is market value in millions (from CRSP)
measured 30 days before the conference presentation. LMV is the log of MV. PIH is the percentage ownership by
institutional investors, defined as total shares owned by institutions divided by the total shares outstanding, for the
most recent calendar quarter end prior to the conference presentation. NANL is the number of unique analysts
issuing an earnings forecast for any horizon during the calendar quarter prior to the conference presentation.
LNANL is the log of one plus NANL. For both PIH and LNANL, we assume the variable has a value of zero for any
period when the company is listed on an exchange but there is no data available. ANNMAR is the buy-and-hold
market-adjusted stock return over the year prior to 30 days before the presentation. ANNTURN is the average
monthly share turnover, computed as volume divided by shares outstanding, for the year prior to 30 days before the
presentation. DFORFIRM is an indicator variable set to 1 if the company is headquartered outside the U.S., 0
otherwise. EP is the earnings-to-price ratio at fiscal year-end (FYE) prior to presentation. DP is the dividend-toprice ratio at FYE prior to presentation. BP is the book-to-price ratio at FYE prior to presentation. CNI is the
change in net income, deflated by market value at FYE prior to presentation. SGR is the sales growth at FYE prior
to presentation. SPINDX is the indicator for listing on any S&P index at FYE prior to presentation. INTAN is the
intangible assets/total assets at FYE prior to presentation. LEV is the leverage at FYE prior to presentation. STD is
the standard deviation of stock returns (from CRSP) for year prior to presentation. BETA is the beta (from CRSP) of
the stock for year prior to presentation. TIME is the number of years the company has been listed. LTIME is the log
of TIME.
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TABLE 3
Mean and Median Stock Market Reactions during Windows around the Presentation Date
Variable
ABS_SAR

Window
(-7, -5)
(-4, -2)
(-1, +1)
(-2, +4)
(-5, +7)

Mean
0.015***
0.036***
0.076***
-0.015***
-0.016***

Median
-0.272***
-0.261***
-0.228***
-0.279***
-0.287***

Pct. > 0
38.0%
38.7%
40.4%
37.5%
37.2%

N
95,103
95,104
95,105
95,103
95,103

ABN_TURN

(-7, -5)
(-4, -2)
(-1, +1)
(-2, +4)
(-5, +7)

-0.040***
0.030***
0.148***
-0.031***
-0.056***

-0.185***
-0.158***
-0.095***
-0.160***
-0.175***

40.0%
41.4%
44.6%
41.1%
40.6%

95,103
95,104
95,105
95,103
95,103

*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test
(means) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (medians).
Table 3 provides means and medians of stock market reaction variables during various three-day windows before
and after firms’ conference presentations. Day 0 is the day on which each firm makes its presentation. The absolute
value of size-adjusted returns (ABS_SAR) is defined as the absolute value of three-day size-adjusted returns less the
mean absolute value of three-day size-adjusted returns during estimation period, divided by the standard deviation of
the absolute values during the estimation period. Abnormal share turnover (ABN_TURN) is defined as the three-day
volume divided by shares outstanding, less the average three-day turnover in the estimation period, times 100. The
estimation period begins 120 days prior to the presentation and ends 30 days prior to the presentation.

TABLE 4
Regressions of Stock Market Reactions during the Three-Day Window
around the Presentation Date on Conference Characteristics and Control Variables
Variable
DPRODMKT
DCAPMKT_TOP
DDEST
DMONCEN
DNONUS
LCONFSIZE
DINDUS_CONF
LPRIORPRES

ABN_SAR
0.070**
0.034**
0.053**
0.073***
0.016
0.020**
0.044**
-0.016*

ABN_TURN
0.127**
0.091**
0.186***
0.156***
-0.001
0.037**
0.064
0.031

DINFO_EVENT
LMV
PIH
LNANL
ANNMAR
ANNTURN
DFORFIRM
EP
DP
BP
CNI
SGR
SPINDX
INTAN
LEV
STD
BETA
LTIME
YEAR EFFECTS
INDUSTRY EFFECTS
N
Adjusted R2

0.280***
-0.019***
0.032
-0.018**
-0.020**
-0.141***
0.015
-0.061
-0.986**
-0.008
0.025
0.017**
0.003
-0.020
0.014
-1.370**
0.017*
-0.003
Included
Included
95,105
0.011

0.733***
-0.001
0.499***
0.017
0.241***
-2.136***
0.070*
0.230
-3.182***
-0.009
-0.003
0.033
-0.062**
-0.038
0.108*
2.484*
0.111***
-0.056***
Included
Included
95,105
0.036

*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test
based on two-way clustered standard errors, with clustering at the firm and conference level and bootstrapping using
the jackknife method
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TABLE 4 (Continued)
Regressions of Stock Market Reactions during the Three-Day Window
around the Presentation Date on Conference Characteristics and Control Variables
Table 4 presents regressions of ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN during the presentation window (-1, +1) on the set of
conference characteristics and control variables. The absolute value of size-adjusted returns (ABS_SAR) is defined
as the absolute value of three-day size-adjusted returns less the mean absolute value of three-day size-adjusted
returns during estimation period, divided by the standard deviation of the absolute values during the estimation
period. Abnormal share turnover (ABN_TURN) is defined as the three-day volume divided by shares outstanding,
less the average three-day turnover in the estimation period, times 100. The estimation period begins 120 days prior
to the presentation and ends 30 days prior to the presentation. DPRODMKT equals 1 if the presentation was at a
product market-focused conference, 0 otherwise. DCAPMKT_TOP equals 1 if the presentation was at a top
brokerage firm, 0 otherwise. DDEST equals 1 if the presentation was at a destination location, 0 otherwise.
DNONUS equals 1 if the presentation was held outside of the U.S., 0 otherwise. DMONCEN equals 1 if the
presentation was at a money center location, 0 otherwise. LCONFSIZE is the log of one plus the number of
presentations that occur at the conference. DINDUS_CONF equals 1 if the presentation was at an industry-focused
conference, 0 otherwise. We define an industry-focused conference as having fewer than four industries represented
at the conference. LPRIORPRES is the log of one the number of conference presentations given by the firm in the
past ninety days. DINFO_EVENT equals 1 if an earnings announcement, management forecast, and/or Form 8-K
filing occurred (including Form 6-K filings for foreign registrants) within the three-day window surrounding the
presentation, 0 otherwise. LMV is the log of the market value in millions (from CRSP) measured 30 days before the
conference presentation. PIH is the percentage ownership by institutional investors, defined as total shares owned
by institutions divided by the total shares outstanding, for the most recent calendar quarter end prior to the
conference presentation. LNANL is the log of one plus the number of unique analysts issuing an earnings forecast
for any horizon during the calendar quarter prior to the conference presentation. For both PIH and LNANL, we
assume the variable has a value of zero for any period when the company is listed on an exchange but there is no
data available. ANNMAR is the buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock return over the year prior to 30 days before the
presentation. ANNTURN is the average monthly share turnover, computed as volume divided by shares outstanding,
for the year prior to 30 days before the presentation. DFORFIRM is an indicator variable set to 1 if the company is
headquartered outside the U.S., 0 otherwise. EP is the earnings-to-price ratio at fiscal year-end (FYE) prior to
presentation. DP is the dividend-to-price ratio at FYE prior to presentation. BP is the book-to-price ratio at FYE
prior to presentation. CNI is the change in net income, deflated by market value at FYE prior to presentation. SGR
is the sales growth at FYE prior to presentation. SPINDX is the indicator for listing on any S&P index at FYE prior
to presentation. INTAN is the intangible assets/total assets at FYE prior to presentation. LEV is the leverage at FYE
prior to presentation. STD is the standard deviation of stock returns (from CRSP) for year prior to presentation.
BETA is the beta (from CRSP) of the stock for year prior to presentation. LTIME is the log of one plus the number
of years the company has been listed. We include year and industry fixed effects but do not report them in the table.

39

TABLE 5
Mean and Median Changes in Analyst Following and Institutional Holdings for Quarters
Subsequent to the Presentation Date

Variable
CNANL2
CNANL4

Mean
0.201***
0.326***

Median
0.000***
0.000***

Pct. > 0
39.4%
44.9%

N
94,321
91,860

CPIH2
CPIH4

0.017***
0.028***

0.010***
0.020***

59.5%
62.5%

94,321
91,860

*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test
(means) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (medians).
Table 5 presents means and medians for changes in analyst following and institutional holdings for two and four
quarters after the conference presentation (quarter 0). NANL is the number of unique analysts issuing earnings
forecasts for any horizon for the firm during a calendar quarter. CNANL2 is the difference between NANL in the
first full calendar quarter after the presentation and the quarter prior to the presentation. Similarly, CNANL4 is the
difference between NANL three full calendar quarters after the presentation and the quarter prior to the presentation
(i.e., the same calendar quarters one year apart). PIH is the percentage ownership by institutional investors, defined
as total shares owned by institutions divided by the total shares outstanding. CPIH2 is the difference between PIH
at the end of the calendar quarter subsequent to the presentation and the end of the quarter prior to the presentation.
CPIH4 is the difference between PIH three full calendar quarters after the presentation and the quarter prior to the
presentation (i.e., the same calendar quarters one year apart).
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TABLE 6
Regressions of Changes in Analyst Following and Institutional Holdings Subsequent to the
Presentation Date on Conference Characteristics and Control Variables
Variable
DPRODMKT
DCAPMKT_TOP
DDEST
DMONCEN
DNONUS
LCONFSIZE
DINDUS_CONF
LPRIORPRES

CNANL2
-0.116***
-0.064**
-0.025
0.011
-0.138**
0.006
0.044
0.177***

CNANL4
-0.263***
-0.062*
0.020
-0.059
-0.153*
0.020
0.130***
0.341***

CPIH2
-0.001
0.002*
0.003
0.000
-0.004*
0.001**
0.000
0.002***

CPIH4
-0.001
0.005***
0.000
0.001
-0.006*
0.002**
-0.001
0.003***

DINFO_EVENT
LMV
PIH
LNANL
ANNMAR
ANNTURN
DFORFIRM
ABN_SAR
ABN_TURN
SAR
EP
DP
BP
CNI
SGR
SPINDX
INTAN
LEV
STD
BETA
LTIME
YEAR EFFECTS
INDUSTRY EFFECTS
N
Adjusted R2

-0.029
0.153***
1.028***
-0.818***
0.475***
0.774***
0.065
-0.039***
0.031***
0.451***
0.682***
0.534
-0.552***
-0.274***
0.078***
-0.099***
-0.070
-0.185***
-3.278*
0.160***
-0.136***
Included
Included
94,321
0.090

-0.027
0.250***
1.646***
-1.440***
0.934***
1.129***
-0.013
-0.058***
0.056***
1.240***
1.122***
-0.525
-0.913***
-0.464***
0.047
-0.096
-0.221
-0.142
-8.470***
0.250***
-0.219***
Included
Included
91,860
0.136

-0.002***
-0.004***
-0.098***
0.009***
0.018***
-0.011**
-0.033***
-0.003***
0.002***
0.076***
0.050***
-0.182***
0.006***
-0.001
-0.002**
0.008***
0.002
0.014***
-0.360***
0.002
-0.004***
Included
Included
94,321
0.060

-0.003**
-0.006***
-0.151***
0.014***
0.023***
-0.029***
-0.050***
-0.003***
0.002***
0.099***
0.093***
-0.286***
0.011***
0.000
-0.005***
0.013***
-0.001
0.024***
-0.313***
0.004**
-0.006***
Included
Included
91,860
0.082

*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test
based on two-way clustered standard errors, with clustering at the firm and conference level and bootstrapping using
the jackknife method
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TABLE 6 (Continued)
Regressions of Changes in Analyst Following and Institutional Holdings Subsequent to the
Presentation Date on Conference Characteristics and Control Variables
Table 6 provides regressions of changes in analyst following and institutional holdings on conference and firm
characteristics. NANL is the number of unique analysts issuing earnings forecasts for any horizon for the firm.
CNANL2 (CNANL4) is the difference between NANL in the first (third) full calendar quarter after the presentation
and the quarter prior to the presentation. PIH is the percentage ownership by institutional investors, defined as total
shares owned by institutions divided by the total shares outstanding. CPIH2 (CPIH4) is the difference between PIH
at the end of the first (third) calendar quarter subsequent to the presentation and the end of the quarter prior to the
presentation. DPRODMKT equals 1 if the presentation was at a product market-focused conference, 0 otherwise.
DCAPMKT_TOP equals 1 if the presentation was at a top brokerage firm, 0 otherwise. DDEST equals 1 if the
presentation was at a destination location, 0 otherwise. DNONUS equals 1 if the presentation was held outside of
the U.S., 0 otherwise. DMONCEN equals 1 if the presentation was at a money center location, 0 otherwise.
LCONFSIZE is the log of one plus the number of presentations that occur at the conference. DINDUS_CONF equals
1 if the presentation was at an industry-focused conference, 0 otherwise. We define an industry-focused conference
as having fewer than four industries represented at the conference. LPRIORPRES is the log of one the number of
conference presentations given by the firm in the past ninety days. DINFO_EVENT equals 1 if an earnings
announcement, management forecast, and/or Form 8-K filing (including Form 6-K filings for foreign registrants)
occurred within the three-day window surrounding the presentation, 0 otherwise. LMV is the log of the market value
in millions (from CRSP) measured 30 days before the conference presentation. PIH is the percentage ownership by
institutional investors, defined as total shares owned by institutions divided by the total shares outstanding, for the
most recent calendar quarter end prior to the conference presentation. LNANL is the log of one plus the number of
unique analysts issuing an earnings forecast for any horizon during the calendar quarter prior to the conference
presentation. For both PIH and LNANL, we assume the variable has a value of zero for any period when the
company is listed on an exchange but there is no data available. ANNMAR is the buy-and-hold market-adjusted
stock return over the year prior to 30 days before the presentation. ANNTURN is the average monthly share
turnover, computed as volume divided by shares outstanding, for the year prior to 30 days before the presentation.
DFORFIRM is an indicator variable set to 1 if the company is headquartered outside the U.S., 0 otherwise.
ABS_SAR is the absolute value of size-adjusted returns, defined as the absolute value of three-day size-adjusted
returns less the mean absolute value of three-day size-adjusted returns during estimation period, divided by the
standard deviation of the absolute values during the estimation period. ABN_TURN is the abnormal share turnover,
defined as the three-day volume divided by shares outstanding, less the average three-day turnover in the estimation
period, times 100. The estimation period begins 120 days prior to the presentation and ends 30 days prior to the
presentation. SAR is the three-day size-adjusted returns surrounding the presentation. EP is the earnings-to-price
ratio at fiscal year-end (FYE) prior to presentation. DP is the dividend-to-price ratio at FYE prior to presentation.
BP is the book-to-price ratio at FYE prior to presentation. CNI is the change in net income, deflated by market
value at FYE prior to presentation. SGR is the sales growth at FYE prior to presentation. SPINDX is the indicator
for listing on any S&P index at FYE prior to presentation. INTAN is the intangible assets/total assets at FYE prior to
presentation. LEV is the leverage at FYE prior to presentation. STD is the standard deviation of stock returns (from
CRSP) for year prior to presentation. BETA is the beta (from CRSP) of the stock for year prior to presentation.
LTIME is the log of one plus the number of years the company has been listed. We include year and industry fixed
effects but do not report them in the table.
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